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I argue that systemic bankruptcy of ﬁrms can originate from coordination failure
in an economy with investment complementarities. This new explanation about the
origin of systemic bankruptcy promotes better understanding of how ﬁnancial fragility
arises, and provides theoretical guidance for central banks to establish an “early warn-
ing system” to prevent the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises. In a global game setup,
investment decisions of ﬁrms are studied in the presence of uncertainty and investment
complementarities. Uncertainty is twofold here: ﬁrst, ﬁrms are uncertain about eco-
nomic fundamentals; second, ﬁrms are also uncertain about other ﬁrms’ investment
decisions. I demonstrate that even small uncertainty about economic fundamentals
can be magniﬁed through the uncertainty about other ﬁrms’ investment decisions and
can lead to coordination failure, which may be manifested as systemic bankruptcy.
Moreover, my model reveals that systemic bankruptcy tends to arise when economic
fundamentals are in the middle range where coordination matters. High ﬁnancial lever-
age of ﬁrms greatly increases the severity of systemic bankruptcy. Optimistic beliefs
of ﬁrms and banks can alleviate coordination failure, but can also increase the severity
of systemic bankruptcy once it happens.
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11 Introduction
Financial stability has gradually become an important topic in economic literature
since the 1980’s, after the world witnessed a series of ﬁnancial crises in both developed
and developing countries. A large body of literature is devoted to explaining the origin
and propagation of ﬁnancial crises (Krugman (1979, 2000); Diamond and Dybvig
(1983); Obstfeld (1996); Cole and Kehoe (1996); Chang and Velasco (2001); Chari
and Kehoe (2003)).
Although most ﬁnancial crises manifest themselves in a seemingly unique man-
ner, a common feature is widespread bankruptcy among both nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and
ﬁnancial institutions. A study on how this kind of bankruptcy arises will help us
understand the origin of ﬁnancial crises and, furthermore, how central banks should
tackle them.
Existing literature on systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and ﬁnancial
institutions primarily focuses on how the bankruptcy of an individual economic agent
is spread to other economic agents through diﬀerent ﬁnancial contagion mechanisms,
such as credit chains and herding behavior (Allen and Gale (2000); Kiyotaki and
Moor (2002); Chen (1999)). The origin of systemic bankruptcy, that is, how the
ﬁrst economic agent goes bankrupt, is simply attributed in the literature to some
exogenously given shock. By doing so, this literature fails to provide any economic
rationale behind the origin of systemic bankruptcy.
This paper focuses on the origin of systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms asso-
ciated with uncertainty in real investment. A formal model is established to demon-
strate that systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms can endogenously originate
from coordination failure in an economy with investment complementarities. This
new explanation promotes better understanding of the origin of ﬁnancial fragility.
Moreover, the model can be used to identify economic situations associated with sys-
temic bankruptcy, and therefore can provide theoretical guidance for central banks
to establish an “early warning system” to prevent the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises.
The model is established in a global game setup, where investment decisions of
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are studied under three conditions. In the ﬁrst, investment com-
2plementarities exist. Therefore, investment returns are determined not only by eco-
nomic fundamentals, but also by the proportion of ﬁrms investing. With more ﬁrms
investing, the investment return is higher. In the second, ﬁrms only have incomplete
information about economic fundamentals. In the third, ﬁrms have to ﬁnance their
investment by debts. In such a setup, ﬁrms face two kinds of uncertainties when
investing: (1) ﬁrms are uncertain about the economic fundamentals, and (2) ﬁrms
are also uncertain about the investment decisions of other ﬁrms. The second kind
of uncertainty, ignored in the existing literature, is endogenously generated in an
economy with investment complementarities. I demonstrate that a even small un-
certainty about economic fundamentals can be magniﬁed through the second kind
of uncertainty, causing coordination failure, which may be manifested as systemic
bankruptcy. Thus, the meaning of systemic bankruptcy is twofold in this paper:
(1) it happens to a large number of ﬁrms in an economy, instead of to an individ-
ual ﬁrm, and (2) it is endogenously rooted in a decentralized credit economy, where
coordination among ﬁrms matters.
One of the key assumptions in this paper is that investment complementarities ex-
ist, and therefore coordination among ﬁrms can be critical. Investment complementar-
ities are widely observed in the economy. They can exist in industries with industry-
speciﬁc externalities, that is, the externalities within an industry. The sources of such
externalities can be the beneﬁts of “within-industry specialization, conglomeration,
indivisibility and public intermediate inputs such as roads” (Caballero and Lyons
(1989)). The industries with network externalities are special examples of such in-
dustries. Network externalities are deﬁned as a change in the utility that an agent
derives from a good, when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of
goods changes. For example, as the Internet is increasingly used as a communication
tool, Internet users ﬁnd it more valuable since they can make greater use of it. So
any investment by a ﬁrm in this industry attracting more internet users will beneﬁt
other ﬁrms in the industry.
My model can be interpreted as a study of systemic bankruptcy in such an in-
dustry. Due to the externalities within the industry, one ﬁrm’s investment return
will be higher with higher investment activities by other ﬁrms. Therefore, there are
3investment complementarities among the ﬁrms in the industry.
Meanwhile, my model can also be interpreted as a study of systemic bankruptcy in
the whole economy, if external economies of scale across industries, or cross-industry
externalities, are taken into account. A source of cross-industry externalities can be
the demand spillover eﬀect. If other ﬁrms in the economy are investing more, they
will be spending more too, and this leads to increased demand for the product of an
individual ﬁrm, which will in general increase the investment return of the ﬁrm. In
addition, if we drop the unrealistic assumption of a Walrasian auctioneer and admit
that there are transaction frictions in an economy, a higher level of economic activ-
ity will lower trading costs and raise the average investment return due to trading
externalities, or the “thick market” eﬀect (Diamond (1982)). The empirical work of
Caballero and Lyons (1989, 1990) reveals that cross-industry externalities are signiﬁ-
cant in the economy. Using the data of two-digit manufacturing industries in Belgium,
West Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S., they test external economies and in-
ternal returns to scale in those countries. Strong evidence of external economies is
found in all the countries.
Using my model, economic situations where systemic bankruptcy tends to arise
can be identiﬁed. In this way, my model provides some theoretical guidance for
central banks to establish an “early warning system” for ﬁnancial crises. According
to my model, systemic bankruptcy tends to arise when economic fundamentals are
in a middle range where coordination failure arises, which I call the coordination
failure zone. More speciﬁcally, systemic bankruptcy tends to happen when economic
fundamentals fall into a low to medium value in this zone. Comparative statics
further reveals that higher ﬁnancial leverage of ﬁrms can greatly increase the severity
of systemic bankruptcy. Moreover, optimistic public beliefs of ﬁrms and optimistic
beliefs of banks about the fundamentals can alleviate coordination failure. The range
in which systemic bankruptcy arises is narrowed. However, systemic bankruptcy can
be more severe once it occurs.
All of the above results are generally consistent with empirical observations on
ﬁnancial crises. A large body of empirical studies on ﬁnancial crises ﬁnds that ﬁnancial
crises tend to arise at the economic downturn of a business cycle, which is shortly
4after the economy reaches its peak (Gorton (1988); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)).
This fact can be interpreted to be consistent with my model’s result that systemic
bankruptcy tends to arise when economic fundamentals take low to medium values in
the coordination failure zone. In my model, coordination failure will not arise when
economic fundamentals are extremely high or low. So systemic bankruptcy will not
arise at the peak or trough of a business cycle. Only when the fundamentals are in
the middle range, especially when the fundamentals are deteriorating from medium
to low level, which can be interpreted as the economy being at the downturn from a
boom, does systemic bankruptcy arise.
According to my model, systemic bankruptcy tends to be more severe when the
ﬁnancial leverage of ﬁrms is high. This result is also consistent with the empirical
observation that ﬁnancial crises tend to happen when the credit/GDP ratio is higher
than that in the tranquil time (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)).
Anecdotal observations on ﬁnancial crises also reveal that ﬁnancial crises tend to
happen at the end of an economic boom, when both banks and ﬁrms are still sanguine
about the economy, which is consistent with the results in my model that although
optimistic public beliefs of ﬁrms and banks can alleviate the coordination failure, they
will increase the severity of systemic bankruptcy once it occurs.
This paper provides a mechanism through which uncertainty in real investment
leads to ﬁnancial fragility, which is manifested as systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms. In this sense this paper is in favor of the “fundamentalist” opinion that ﬁnan-
cial crises are caused by real economic factors. However, the mechanism in this paper
can be easily combined with ﬁnancial contagion theories. As mentioned before, the
mechanism that I provide here can be regarded as an alternative explanation about
the exogenously given shock in ﬁnancial contagion theories. Bankruptcy caused by
the mechanism in this paper can be further spread to other economic agents through
ﬁnancial contagion mechanisms, leading to more severe bankruptcy. An important
message conveyed in my paper is that due to investment complementarities, the econ-
omy will be more vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises. Systemic bankruptcy can occur even
without signiﬁcant economic shocks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives literature survey. In
5section 3 a basic model is presented. Section 4 analyzes how economic fundamentals,
ﬁnancial leverage, and public beliefs of ﬁrms aﬀect systemic bankruptcy. Section 5
introduces banks without private signals into the basic model and examines the role
that banks play in systemic bankruptcy. In section 6, banks with private signals
are introduced. In section 7, conclusions and policy implications are given. Future
research is also discussed.
2 Literature Survey
This paper is related to three strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand of literature is
on ﬁnancial crises, especially on systemic bankruptcy in both nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and
ﬁnancial institutions.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) study systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms orig-
inating from two contagion mechanisms. One is the trade credit chain, and the other
is the fall of the price of a collateral asset. The spread of bank failure from one
banking region to another due to the overlapping claims of the banks on each other
is explored by Allen and Gale (2000). Chen (1999) models how bank failure in a few
banks can cause runs on other banks due to asymmetric information.
The second strand of literature is on macroeconomic complementarities and their
implications for the economy. Bryant (1983) uses a special form of production func-
tion to study how technological complementarities generate Pareto-ranked multiple
equilibria. The business cycle implications of technology complementarities is ex-
plored by Baxter and King (1991) in a model whose structure is similar to a standard
real business cycle model, where the business cycle generated by a demand shock and
propagated through the technological complementarities is quantitatively modeled.
Diamond (1982) studies how trading externalities cause ”thick market” eﬀects in
the presence of trade frictions. He ﬁnds that the return of an individual economic
agent will be higher due to the reduced searching costs if more agents are in the
market searching trading partners.
Cooper (1999) comprehensively surveys macroeconomic complementarities and
their implications for macroeconomic behavior. He examines a variety of sources of
6macroeconomic complementarities, such as technological complementarities, demand
spillover eﬀects and trading externalities, and studies their implications.
The third strand of literature is about global games and their applications in
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability.
Global games were ﬁrst established by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). They
introduce incomplete information into a traditional coordination game with perfect
information. In the game each player observes his payoﬀs with some noise. By
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, they prove that when the noise
gets inﬁnitely small, there is a unique equilibrium in the game.
Morris and Shin (1998) study currency attacks in a global game setup. They ﬁnd
that when speculators need to coordinate their actions to successfully attack a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, and meanwhile are only able to observe economic fundamentals
with some small noise, there is a unique equilibrium in the game, determined by both
economic fundamentals and the beliefs of speculators. This result diﬀers from that of
a traditional coordination game with perfect information, where a currency attack is
solely determined by the self-fulﬁlling beliefs of speculators. Successfully overcoming
the problem of indeterminacy of multiple equilibria models, their model allows the
analysis of policy implications.
Morris and Shin (2000) summarize the applications of global games in macroeco-
nomic modeling by explaining how global games can be used in the context of bank
runs, currency crises, and debt pricing. They argue that global games are a useful
approach for the analysis of many macroeconomic issues where players’ payoﬀs are
interdependent. They reckon that global games provide a more solid ground for policy
analysis than multiple equilibria models due to their property of unique equilibrium.
How public information inﬂuences equilibrium allocation and social welfare in
economies with investment complementarities is studied by Angeletos and Pavan
(2004). They demonstrate that when coordination is socially desirable, an increase in
the precision of public information will always increase social welfare, given that the
complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique. On the other hand,
when the complementarities are strong, such that multiple equilibria are possible,
the increase in public information may facilitate the coordination in both “bad” and
7“good” equilibria.
Chamley (2004) gives a survey on coordination games and global games. A de-
tailed summary about the theory and applications of global games is also given by
Morris and Shin (2003).
3 The Basic Model
This model is based on Morris and Shin (2000). In their model, a continuum of
depositors of mass 1 has to decide whether to run a bank or not, based on their
beliefs about deposit returns, which are determined by both economic fundamentals
and the actions of other depositors. I apply their model to investment decisions of
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in an economy with investment complementarities. The ﬁrms are
analogous to the depositors, and investment returns are analogous to deposit returns.
Technically, my model diﬀers from theirs in that the ﬁrms are assumed to ﬁnance
their investment by debts. Thus the payoﬀ structure of the ﬁrms is asymmetric
and the ﬁrms care about the upside risks only when their capital is positive.1 This
greatly complicates the calculation of the expected payoﬀs of the ﬁrms. Both the
investment returns (given realized economic fundamentals levels) and the threshold
level of economic fundamentals (above which the ﬁrms’ capital becomes positive) will
change in the ﬁrms’ strategies. I prove that the main properties of global games are
still held in such a situation. Moveover, in sections 5 and 6, two models with banks
are established respectively. These two two-stage games in which banks move at the
ﬁrst stage and ﬁrms move at the second stage further diﬀer from the one-stage game
established by Morris and Shin (2000).
There is a continuum of risk-neutral ﬁrms with initial wealth w0 who have to
simultaneously decide whether to invest or not.
The gross return rate is 1 if a ﬁrm chooses not to invest. The gross return rate
1Morris and Shin (2004) study the issue that creditors of a distressed borrower have to decide
whether to withdraw their loans or not. The creditors in their model also have an asymmetric payoﬀ
structure. But since their model focuses on a totally diﬀerent issue, the whole setup of their model
is quite diﬀerent from mine.
8from investing is er−l. Here r denotes economic fundamentals of the investment, and
l denotes the proportion of ﬁrms not investing. Thus the return of the investment is
increasing both in economic fundamentals and in the proportion of the ﬁrms investing,
1 − l. The latter introduces investment complementarities to the game.
The investment is assumed to have a ﬁxed size of mw0, where m > 1 is exogenously
given. So a ﬁrm investing has to borrow (m − 1)w0. The gross borrowing rate is
exogenously given by 1. Later it will be endogenized by introducing banks into the
model.
3.1 The Case with Perfect Information
With perfect information about r, this game has three possible cases:
When r > 1, there is a unique equilibrium in which all ﬁrms invest. No bankruptcy
occurs.
When r < 0, there is also a unique equilibrium in which all ﬁrms do not invest.
No bankruptcy occurs either.
When 0 < r < 1, there are two (stable) equilibria. One is that all ﬁrms invest,
with l = 0 and r − l > 0. The other is that all ﬁrms do not invest, with l = 1 and
r − l < 0. No bankruptcy occurs in both equilibria.
3.2 The Case with Incomplete Information
Now I introduce incomplete information into the model. Suppose that at the begin-
ning of the game each ﬁrm has an identical prior belief about the fundamentals of
the investment, ˜ r ∼ N(¯ r,1/α). Here α is the precision of ˜ r and 1/α is its variance.
This belief is also called the public belief. In addition, after economic fundamentals
are realized, each ﬁrm has access to very precise but not perfect information about
them before it makes its decision. More speciﬁcally, given the realization of ˜ r, r, ﬁrm
i observes the realization of signal xi = r +εi, where εi ∼ N(0,1/β). εi is i.i.d across
the ﬁrms.
After observing the private signal xi, ﬁrm i updates its belief about the funda-
9mentals according to Bayes’ rule. Thus (˜ r|xi) is also normally distributed with mean
ρi =
α¯ r + βxi
α + β
(1)
and precision α + β. Let γ = α2
β .
Proposition 1 Provided that γ ≤ 2π, there is a unique symmetric trigger strategy
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, ﬁrm i chooses to borrow and invest if and only if
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where φ(.) and Φ(.) are respectively the PDF and CDF of a standard normal distri-














Otherwise, the ﬁrm chooses not to invest.
Proof:
There are two ways to prove the equilibrium in this game. One way is to use
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The other way is to conﬁne
attention to symmetric trigger strategy equilibria and to prove that there is such a
unique equilibrium.
I will ﬁrst give the proof that conﬁnes attention to symmetric trigger strategies.
There are two steps involved. First, I pinpoint the unique value of ρ∗ such that in
equilibrium each ﬁrm i will invest if and only if ρi > ρ∗. Second, I demonstrate that
this strategy is optimal for all the ﬁrms.
For ρ∗ to be an equilibrium switching point, a ﬁrm with the private signal x∗ and
updated belief ρ∗ must be indiﬀerent between investing and not investing. Recall that
the relationship between x∗ and ρ∗ is given by equation (1).





10that is, the gross return of ﬁrm x∗(here I abuse the notation of x∗, the ﬁrm’s private
signal, to denote the ﬁrm) from not investing is always equal to 1.
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Equation (2) is the key equation in the whole paper, which is derived as follows.
First, the expected gross return rate of ﬁrm x∗ is based on its belief on the
fundamentals, which is (˜ r|x∗) ∼ N(ρ∗, 1




α + β(r − ρ∗)).
Second, given each realized value of ˜ r, r, and given that all the ﬁrms take the










β(ρ∗ − r + α
β(ρ∗ − ¯ r))) is the proportion of the ﬁrms not investing. It is
derived as follows:
l(r,ρ
∗) = Prob(˜ x < x












∗ − ¯ r) − r)).
That is, it is the proportion of the ﬁrms whose private signal ˜ x is less than x∗ =
ρ∗ + α
β(ρ∗ − ¯ r). The CDF of ˜ x is Φ(
√
β(x − r)), since given r, ˜ x ∼ N(r, 1
β).
When mw0er−l < (m − 1)w0, or r − l < ln m−1
m , or r < r∗, the ﬁrm loses all of its
initial wealth, w0, and its gross return rate is 0. When r − l > ln m−1
m , or r > r∗, the
ﬁrm earns the gross return rate of mer−l − m + 1.
Here r∗ is the unique solution to
r − l = r − Φ(
p
β(ρ
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r∗, below which r − l < ln m−1
m and above which r − l > ln m−1
m .





In addition, I deﬁne the gross return rate of ﬁrm x∗ given each realized value of ˜ r.
It is straightforward to get the expected gross return rate of ﬁrm x∗, equation(2).
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∗) = 1. (4)
I can prove that given γ < 2π, the expected gross return rate of ﬁrm x∗ is strictly
increasing in ρ∗. Therefore, there is a unique solution of ρ∗ to equation (4). The proof
is given in appendix 1.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the trigger strategy ρ∗ is optimal for














From the above equation we can see that Φ(
√
α + β(r − ρi)) ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates Φ(
√
α + β(r − ρ∗)) when xi > x∗, and is ﬁrst order stochastically




β (ρ∗−¯ r))−m+1 is strictly
increasing in r. Since the expected gross return rate is 1 if and only if ρi = ρ∗, the
expected gross return rate is less than 1 when ρi < ρ∗, and is greater than 1 when
ρi > ρ∗. Thus the trigger strategy ρ∗ is optimal for all the ﬁrms.
In appendix 2, the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is used to
prove that this is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D
Notice that this game can be completely changed by introducing a coordinator,
who asks each ﬁrm to submit its private signal and makes investment decisions for
the ﬁrms. The Pareto optimal equilibrium can be at least one possible equilibrium
12in such a setup. In this equilibrium, the private signals from all ﬁrms are collected.
Thus the uncertainty about economic fundamentals vanishes. Moreover, since the
coordinator can coordinate the investment actions between ﬁrms, the uncertainty
about other ﬁrms’ actions vanishes too. But in a decentralized economy without such
a coordinator, the uncertainty about both economic fundamentals and other ﬁrms’
actions leads to ineﬃciency in the equilibrium, which I will demonstrate later to be
manifested as systemic bankruptcy. In this sense I argue that this model provides a
new explanation about systemic bankruptcy caused by coordination failure.
4 The Analysis of the Basic Model
In this section, the basic model is used to study how systemic bankruptcy is inﬂuenced
by diﬀerent factors. Section 4.1 studies the relationship between realized economic
fundamentals r and systemic bankruptcy; how ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial leverage inﬂuences
systemic bankruptcy is analyzed in section 4.2; section 4.3 analyzes the impact of
public beliefs about the fundamentals, ¯ r, on systemic bankruptcy.
In this section, numerical examples are given to gain some qualitative insights. I
choose α = 1 and β = 100 such that γ < 2π. In addition, the uncertainty about
economic fundamentals is assumed to be extremely small (β = 100) to demonstrate
that systemic bankruptcy is mainly caused by the uncertainty about other ﬁrms’
investment decisions. I choose m = 2, or capital/asset ratio= 1/m = 0.5. This ratio
varies from 0.2 to 0.6 in diﬀerent countries in reality. Finally, 0 < ¯ r = 0.5 < 1 since I
am interested in the coordination failure zone.
4.1 Realized Economic Fundamentals and Systemic Bankruptcy
This section studies how the realized economic fundamentals, r inﬂuences systemic
bankruptcy. I ﬁnd that systemic bankruptcy only appears when economic fundamen-
tals are in the middle range where coordination matters, which I call the coordination
failure zone. More speciﬁcally, systemic bankruptcy begins to arise when r is lower
than a threshold level. But the severity of bankruptcy is not monotonically decreasing
13in r. Instead it reaches its peak when r falls into a low to medium range.
First, bankruptcy appears only when r is lower than a threshold level, r. Since
˜ x ∼ N(r,1/β), the proportion of ﬁrms not investing is given by:






A ﬁrm will go bankrupt if and only if mw0er−l(r) < (m−1)w0, or r−l(r) < ln(m−1
m ).
Since r − l(r) is strictly increasing in r, there is a unique r satisfying




Second, given r < r, the bankruptcy rate is 1−l(r), that is, the proportion of the
ﬁrms investing. Since l(r) is decreasing in r, the bankruptcy rate is increasing in r.
Third, the unpaid debts of an individual ﬁrm when r < r, (m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0,
are decreasing in r.
In order to fully reﬂect the severity of systemic bankruptcy, I introduce a single
creditor, who lends to all the ﬁrms. Its total loss from lending, deﬁned by equation
(6), is used to measure the severity of bankruptcy:
TL(r) = (1 − l(r)) × max{(m − 1)w0 − e
r−lmw0,0}. (6)
According to equation (6), TL is not monotonically decreasing in r. Instead, there
are two opposite eﬀects on TL when r is decreasing. On the one hand, the unpaid
debts of an individual ﬁrm, (m−1)w0 −er−lmw0, are increasing. On the other hand,
1 − l(r), the proportion of ﬁrms going bankrupt, is decreasing. Due to these two
opposite eﬀects, bankruptcy is the most severe when r is at some value lower than r,
where TL reaches its maximum value, which I call the maximum loss.
This result seems counter-intuitive, since we usually expect that bankruptcy is
the most severe when the fundamentals are the worst. But it is not surprising in
this model, since here bankruptcy will happen only when ﬁrms invest. A ﬁrm can
always avoid loss by not investing. So it is not the adverse fundamentals, but the
uncertainty about the adverse fundamentals and about the actions of other ﬁrms,
that causes systemic bankruptcy. Later I will show that the latter uncertainty can
14be the main cause of systemic bankruptcy, when the ﬁrst uncertainty is assumed to
be extremely small (ﬁrms have very precise private information). The uncertainty
about the actions of other ﬁrms matters only when 0 < r < 1, where coordination is
in need. Lower r reduces the bankruptcy rate, leading to less total loss. When r < 0,
the economy is out of the coordination failure zone and uncertainty about other ﬁrms’
actions is vanishingly small. Therefore no systemic bankruptcy arises.
Table 1: A numerical example with α = 1, β = 100, m = 2, ¯ r = 0.5, and w0 = 100
x∗ ρ∗ r r at maximum loss maximum loss
0.4237 0.4244 0.2580 0.2226 0.1334
A numerical example with the parameter values given at the beginning of this
section reveals the conclusions above. Table 1 tells us that ﬁrm i will invest if and
only if its updated belief ρi > 0.4244, or its private signal xi > 0.4237. Bankruptcy
appears when r < 0.2580. The total loss reaches its maximum value of 0.1334 when
r = 0.2226. Notice that r at the maximum loss is pretty high. That is because 1 − l
rapidly decreases to 0 with the decrease of r, which eﬀectively reduces the total loss.




















































g l changes with realized economic
fundamentals r
15Figure 1 shows that l goes to 1 when the realization of r > 0.7 and to 0 when the
realization of r < 0.2. It is so because β is high and l(r) = Φ(
√
β(x∗ − r)) rapidly
goes to 1 when r decreases and to 0 when r increases.







































































From ﬁgure 2, we can see that bankruptcy appears only when 0 < r < 1, where
coordination matters. More speciﬁcally, it begins to occur after the fundamental r
reaches 0.2580, and the total loss rapidly increases to its maximum when r decreases
to 0.2226. Then it rapidly decreases to 0 when r gets lower. The intuition behind
this result is as follows: when r ﬁrst decreases from the threshold level r where
bankruptcy begins to occur, the increase from the individual ﬁrm’s unpaid debts,
(m−1)w0−er−lmw0, dominates the decrease in the bankruptcy rate, 1−l(r). However,
since β is high, that is, the ﬁrms have a very precise private signal about r, the
proportion of ﬁrms not investing, l(r) = Φ(
√
β(x∗ − r)), rapidly goes to 1 when
r decreases. Therefore, the bankruptcy rate, 1 − l(r), rapidly decreases to 0 with
r’s further decrease, and its eﬀect dominates the increase from the individual ﬁrm’s
unpaid debts, (m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0.
In order to demonstrate that bankruptcy in this model is mainly caused by the
uncertainty about other ﬁrms’ investment decisions, I give an example without invest-
16ment complementarities. Keeping all the parameter values unchanged in the above
numerical example, I assume that the investment return is only determined by er.
Table 2 gives the results.
Table 2: A numerical example with α = 1, β = 100, m = 2, ¯ r = 0.5, w0 = 100 and
no investment complementarities
x∗ ρ∗ r r at maximum loss maximum loss
-0.01 -0.005 -0.6931 -0.7100 2.1389×10−12
The maximum loss is almost equal to zero in this case, which is far less than that of
0.1334 in the case with investment complementarities. This example clearly reveals
that the uncertainty about other ﬁrms’ investment decisions can be an important
source of systemic bankruptcy, even when the uncertainty about the fundamentals is
extremely small and causes almost no bankruptcy.
4.2 Financial Leverage and Systemic Bankruptcy
This section analyzes how ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial leverage inﬂuences systemic bankruptcy. I
ﬁnd that with higher ﬁnancial leverage, systemic bankruptcy arises in wider economic
fundamentals range, and is more severe once it happens.
Observe that m inﬂuences bankruptcy in three ways. First, ρ∗, the equilibrium
switching point, is a function of m. But the relationship between ρ∗ and m is am-
biguous. It depends on the distribution of (˜ r|xi). With a higher m, the ﬁrms can
earn more proﬁts when er−l(r) > 1, or r − l(r) > 0. But the ﬁrms also lose more
when er−l(r) < 1, or r − l(r) < 0. Second, we know that the threshold fundamen-
tals level for bankruptcy r is determined by equation (5). So when ρ∗ is given, r is
increasing in m. Third, given ρ∗ and r < r, the unpaid debt of an individual ﬁrm,
(m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0, is increasing in m. Therefore, the second and third eﬀects of
a higher m will deﬁnitely increase the severity of bankruptcy.
It is diﬃcult to get an unambiguous relationship between m and systemic bankruptcy
analytically. A numerical example will help reveal the total eﬀect of m on systemic
bankruptcy. Keeping the values of all the other parameters unchanged, I want to see
17how ρ∗, r, r at the maximum loss, and the maximum loss change when m changes
from 1.5 to 3.0.
It turns out that m has little impact on ρ∗. ρ∗ is constant when m varies from 1.5
to 3.0. This is because the precision of the updated belief of ﬁrm x∗, α + β = 101,
is so high that its expected payoﬀ is determined only by a small range of values of
mer−l − m + 1, where er−l is close to 1 and m has little impact.

























Figure 3: How total loss changes with ﬁnancial leverage m
Figure 3 shows that systemic bankruptcy appears in wider fundamentals range
with higher m. The threshold level of the fundamentals where systemic bankruptcy
begins to appear, r, is strictly increasing in m. The intuition is straightforward: the
more a ﬁrm borrows, the more easily it is unable to repay its debts. The realized
fundamentals r at the maximum total loss is also strictly increasing in m. In addition,
the severity of systemic bankruptcy at each given realized economic fundamentals level
is strictly increasing in m. The maximum total loss is trivial and close to 0 when m
is around 1.5. Then it takes oﬀ and goes above 3.5 when m = 3.
So the impact of m on systemic bankruptcy works mainly through the rest of the
two channels as long as the private signal of ﬁrms is highly precise. The severity of
systemic bankruptcy increases rapidly with the increase in m.
184.3 Public Beliefs and Systemic Bankruptcy
This section examines the relationship between the mean of the public belief ¯ r and
systemic bankruptcy. It reveals that a higher ¯ r leads to more investment and alleviates
coordination failure. The range of economic fundamentals where systemic bankruptcy
arises is narrowed. However, systemic bankruptcy tends to be more severe once it
happens.

















is strictly increasing in ¯ r, x∗(ρ∗) is decreasing in ¯ r. Therefore, given each realized r,
the proportion of ﬁrms investing, is increasing in ¯ r, because




where x∗ is decreasing in ¯ r.
Coordination is easier with more optimistic public beliefs about the fundamentals,
¯ r. This is because a ﬁrm observing a good public signal not only anticipates that
the fundamentals are good, but also anticipates that other ﬁrms will believe that the
fundamentals are good, and will tend to invest more.
Since r − l(r, ¯ r) = ln(m−1
m ), a higher ¯ r will decrease r. Meanwhile, the unpaid
debts of an individual ﬁrm, (m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0, decrease at each given realized
fundamentals level r due to higher proportion of ﬁrms investing. But at the same
time, the bankruptcy rate given each r < r, 1 − l(r, ¯ r) increases.
A numerical example is given to show the relationship. Keeping the values of all
the other parameters unchanged, we want to see how ρ∗, r, r at the maximum loss,
and the maximum loss change when ¯ r varies from 0 to 1.0.
Figure 4 shows that ρ∗ is strictly decreasing in ¯ r. That is, optimistic public
beliefs about the economic fundamentals encourage more investment and alleviates
coordination failure.
Figure 5 shows that with higher ¯ r, systemic bankruptcy appears only in a narrower
economic fundamentals range. The threshold fundamentals level where bankruptcy










Figure 4: How ﬁrms’ optimal trigger strategy ρ∗ changes with public beliefs ¯ r

























Figure 5: How total loss changes with public beliefs ¯ r
begins to arise, r, is decreasing in ¯ r. This is because with the improvement in co-
ordination, investment return is higher at any given level of economic fundamentals.
For the same reason, the level of the fundamentals at which systemic bankruptcy is
the severest is also lower with higher ¯ r. It is interesting to see that higher ¯ r leads
20to more severe systemic bankruptcy once it occurs. The intuition is that optimistic
public beliefs induce more ﬁrms to invest at each fundamentals level. Thus, when the
fundamentals turn out to be weak, the bankruptcy rate is higher, leading to higher
total loss.
5 A Model with Banks
In this section, banks are introduced into the basic model to endogenize the borrowing
rate. Here I do not intend to explain why banks exist in an economy. I simply assume
that the transaction costs between investors and ﬁrms are prohibitively high, and the
ﬁrms have to ﬁnance their investment via banks.
5.1 The Model
N risk neutral banks compete over the borrowing rate to maximize their proﬁts.
The banks are assumed to hold the public belief about economic fundamentals,
˜ r ∼ N(¯ r,1/α). This public belief is shared by the ﬁrms. Later I will introduce banks
with their own private signals.
The banks are assumed to have limitless access to funds at the risk-free rate of 1.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the ﬁrst stage, the banks oﬀer e¯ rb, the
gross borrowing rate, to the ﬁrms. At the second stage, given the borrowing rate
and their own private signals, the ﬁrms decide whether to invest or not. The game
of the ﬁrms is the same as before, except that now they face a diﬀerent borrowing
rate. Thus it is a sequential game with the banks as the leaders, and the ﬁrms as the
followers.
I can prove that there is a unique subgame perfect Baysian equilibrium in this
game. Let γ0 = α2
β .
Proposition 2 Provided that γ0 ≤ 2π, and the public belief ¯ r is high enough for
the banks to make nonnegative proﬁt, there is a unique subgame perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the banks oﬀer the borrowing rate of e¯ r∗
b. Given this
21borrowing rate, ﬁrm i chooses to borrow and invest if and only if ρi > ρ∗. Otherwise,
the ﬁrm chooses not to invest. Given ¯ rb = ¯ r∗
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Backward induction is used to ﬁnd the subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
this game. First, I can prove that there is a unique equilibrium in the game of the
ﬁrms. In equilibrium, a ﬁrm will invest if and only if its updated belief ρ > ρ∗.
The proof is basically the same as that in section 3 with few modiﬁcations. Here I
only give the proof conﬁned to symmetric trigger strategies. The method of iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategy can also be applied here to prove the unique
equilibrium.
To ﬁnd the unique equilibrium in the game of the ﬁrms, I need to pinpoint ρ∗
ﬁrst. Suppose that ﬁrm i is at the switching point, that is, ρi = ρ∗, then it must be
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∗ − ¯ r))).
Using the same method in appendix 1, I can prove that the above equation is
strictly increasing in ρ∗, given α2
β < 2π. Here I omit the proof. Based on the above
equation, I ﬁnd the unique solution of ρ∗(¯ rb). It is easy to show that the symmetric
trigger strategy ρ∗ is optimal for every ﬁrm.
Now let us look at the ﬁrst mover of this game, the banks. The banks fully
understand the game among the ﬁrms and the equilibrium strategies of the ﬁrms.
Taking the equilibrium strategies of the ﬁrms into consideration, the banks will set
the lowest borrowing rate ¯ rb that makes zero expected proﬁt in the banking sector.
This is the unique equilibrium and no bank will deviate. By raising the borrowing
rate above the equilibrium rate, a bank will not have any ﬁrm to lend to. On the
other hand, by lowering the borrowing rate, the bank will make negative proﬁts.
Given that the banks’ belief about the fundamentals is ˜ r ∼ N(¯ r,1/α), the ex-
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The gross borrowing rate, e¯ r∗
b, that a bank will charge is the smallest positive
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23Notice that when ¯ r is low enough, the expected proﬁt of banks from lending will
be always non-positive. Thus the banks will lend if and only if ¯ r is large enough, such
that max{EΠb(ρ∗, ¯ rb)} ≥ 0. Or the banks will choose not to lend.
Q.E.D
5.2 The Analysis of the Model
In this section, numerical examples are given to examine how systemic bankruptcy will
be inﬂuenced by the realization of economic fundamentals, ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial leverage,
and public beliefs when the borrowing rate is endogenously given.
5.2.1 Systemic Bankruptcy and Realized Economic Fundamentals
In this model with banks, ﬁrms will still take the optimal trigger strategy ρ∗ in
equilibrium. Therefore, the relationship between systemic bankruptcy and realized
economic fundamentals will be similar to what I found in the basic model without
banks except that the level of ρ∗ will be diﬀerent due to diﬀerent borrowing costs.
A numerical example with α = 1, β = 100, m = 2, ¯ r = 0.5, and w0 = 100 is
given. I ﬁnd that banks will charge a borrowing rate of e0.00008, which is extremely
close to 1. The ﬁrms’ optimal trigger strategy ρ∗ = 0.4245 is also very close to
0.4244, the optimal trigger strategy in the case with an exogenously given borrowing
rate. Therefore, the results in section 4.1 about the relationship between systemic
bankruptcy and economic fundamentals still holds here.
The reason that the gross borrowing rate charged by bank is extremely close to 1 is
that β is high and ﬁrms have very precise information about economic fundamentals.
Thus banks expect that the proportion of ﬁrms borrowing, 1−l(r), when bankruptcy
arises (r < r∗) is extremely low, and that their expected loss from lending is also
extremely low. On the other hand, when r > r∗, banks expect that the proportion of
ﬁrms borrowing, 1 − l(r), is high, and their expected gain from lending is high too.
Since banks only aim at zero proﬁt, they will charge an extremely low borrowing rate.
This feature will hold in the rest of the numerical examples. Therefore, in general,
banks will not greatly change ﬁrms’ equilibrium behavior through charging diﬀerent
24borrowing rates in this model.
5.2.2 Systemic Bankruptcy and Financial Leverage
Comparative statics reveals that the equilibrium trigger strategy of ﬁrms will slightly
increase in m. Meanwhile, the severity of systemic bankruptcy rapidly increases in
ﬁnancial leverage. With higher ﬁnancial leverage, the range of economic fundamentals
where systemic bankruptcy arises is wider, and the total loss at each level of economic
fundamentals is higher.
Financial leverage will inﬂuence systemic bankruptcy in the following ways: ﬁrst,
the equilibrium borrowing rate charged by the banks, e¯ r∗
b, and the equilibrium trigger
strategy by the ﬁrms, ρ∗, are functions of m. Second, given ρ∗, the threshold fun-
damentals level for bankruptcy, r, is increasing in m. Third, the unpaid debt of an
individual ﬁrm, (m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0, is increasing in m. The last two eﬀects are
exactly the same as those in the case without banks.
A numerical example with α = 1, β = 100, ¯ r = 0.5, w0 = 100, and m changing
from 1.5 to 3 is given.






































b changes with ﬁnancial leverage m
Figure 6 reveals that the banks will charge higher borrowing rates with higher m.
25This result is intuitive. With higher m, ﬁrms more easily go bankrupt and the banks
have to charge a higher borrowing rate to gain zero expected proﬁt.











































y ρ∗ changes with ﬁnancial leverage m
Figure 7 shows that ρ∗, the optimal trigger strategy of the ﬁrms, is increasing
in m. This is because the higher borrowing rate decreases the expected payoﬀ of
the ﬁrms from investing. Now ﬁrms will invest only when they have higher updated
beliefs about the fundamentals.
Figures 8, 9 and 10 illustrate that higher ﬁnancial leverage m greatly increases the
severity of systemic bankruptcy. With higher m, the range of economic fundamentals
where systemic bankruptcy arises is wider, and the total loss is higher at any given
level of economic fundamentals.
5.2.3 Systemic Bankruptcy and Public Beliefs
Comparative statics reveals that higher public beliefs can alleviate coordination fail-
ure. With higher public beliefs, more ﬁrms invest at each level of economic fundamen-
tals, leading to higher investment return. The range of economic fundamentals where
systemic bankruptcy arises is narrower with higher public beliefs. But once systemic
bankruptcy happens, the total loss is higher with higher public beliefs.





























Figure 8: How economic fundamentals r at maximum loss changes with ﬁnancial
leverage m






























Figure 9: How maximum loss changes with ﬁnancial leverage m
Analytically, public beliefs will inﬂuence systemic bankruptcy in the following way:
ﬁrst, given the borrowing rate e¯ rb, public beliefs will inﬂuence the equilibrium outcome
in the same way as it does in the case without banks. Optimal strategy ρ∗ is lower with
























Figure 10: How total loss changes with ﬁnancial leverage m
higher public beliefs ¯ r, inducing more ﬁrms to invest at each economic fundamentals
level. The threshold economic fundamental level where systemic bankruptcy begins
to arise, r, is lower. Given r < r, bankruptcy rate 1 − l(r) increases, and the unpaid
debt of an individual ﬁrm, (m − 1)w0 − er−lmw0, decreases.
Second, with banks in the model, the public belief ¯ r is also the banks’ belief and
its change will inﬂuence banks’ expected proﬁts and consequently the borrowing rate
they charge, e¯ rb. This will work through two channels: ﬁrst, higher ¯ r leads to higher
expectations about r, and higher return at each realized economic fundamentals level
due to lower expected ρ∗, leading to higher expected proﬁts of the banks. Second,
higher ¯ r leads to higher investment when bankruptcy occurs, leading to lower expected
proﬁts for the banks.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd the analytical solution to deﬁne the relationship between
public beliefs and systemic bankruptcy. Here I will give a numerical example with
α = 1, β = 100, m = 2, w0 = 100, and ¯ r varying from 0.1 to 1.
The quantitative relationship between public beliefs and systemic bankruptcy is
similar to that in the case without banks. However, theoretically, in this model
with banks, public beliefs will inﬂuence ﬁrms’ optimal strategy ρ∗ through one more
28channel: changing the borrowing rate e¯ rb that the banks oﬀer. The numerical example
reveals that with higher public beliefs, the banks will charge lower borrowing rates,
which will further lower the ﬁrms’ optimal strategy ρ∗ compared to the case without
banks. Thus optimistic public beliefs have three functions in this case: ﬁrst, they
induce optimistic beliefs of ﬁrms about economic fundamentals. Second, they induce
optimistic beliefs of ﬁrms about other ﬁrms’ beliefs about economic fundamentals.
Third, they induce optimistic beliefs of banks about investment returns. All will lead
to lower optimal strategy ρ∗ and higher investment returns in equilibrium.













































b changes with public beliefs ¯ r
Figure 11 shows that the borrowing rate is lower with higher public beliefs. This
is because the banks with higher beliefs about economic fundamentals have higher
expected payoﬀs from lending, and only need to charge a lower borrowing rate to gain
zero proﬁt.
In ﬁgure 12, higher public beliefs lead to lower optimal trigger strategy of the ﬁrms,
ρ∗ for two reasons. First, the banks are charging a lower borrowing rate. Second,
higher public beliefs raise the beliefs of the ﬁrms about the return from investing.
Both will encourage ﬁrms to invest.
Figures 13, 14 and 15 reveal that with higher public beliefs, the range of economic












Figure 12: How optimal trigger strategy ρ∗ changes with public beliefs ¯ r






























Figure 13: How economic fundamentals r at maximum loss changes with public beliefs
¯ r
fundamentals where systemic bankruptcy arises is narrower. But the total loss is
generally higher once systemic bankruptcy occurs.























Figure 14: How maximum loss changes with public beliefs ¯ r

























Figure 15: How total loss changes with public beliefs ¯ r
6 The Model Where Banks Have Private Signals
6.1 The Model
This section studies the case when the banks have their own private signals. The prior
belief of banks about economic fundamentals is still ˜ r ∼ N(¯ r,1/α). This public belief
31is also shared by the ﬁrms. In addition, all the banks receive the same realization
of private signal about economic fundamentals, xb = r + εb, where εb is normally
distributed with mean 0 and precision βb. This signal is also observed by the ﬁrms.
I can prove that there is a unique subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this
game. Let γ1 =
(α+βb)2
β .
Proposition 3 Provided that γ1 ≤ 2π and the private signal of the banks, xb, is high
enough for them to make zero expected proﬁt from lending, there is a unique subgame
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the banks oﬀer the borrowing rate
of e¯ r∗
b. Given this borrowing rate, ﬁrm i chooses to borrow and invest if and only if
ρi > ρ∗. Otherwise, the ﬁrm chooses not to invest. Given ¯ rb = ¯ r∗
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Proof: See appendix 3.
6.2 Banks with Private Signals and Systemic Bankruptcy
This section analyzes the role that banks play in systemic bankruptcy when the banks
have their own private signal. Given the setup in the model, systemic bankruptcy
is inﬂuenced by banks in two ways. First, the belief of the banks about economic
32fundamentals will determine their lending condition, e¯ r∗
b, which will inﬂuence the
expected payoﬀs of the ﬁrms. I call it the payoﬀ eﬀect. Second, the belief of the
banks about economic fundamentals will also inﬂuence the beliefs of the ﬁrms through
Bayesian updating rule. The second eﬀect inﬂuences systemic bankruptcy in the same
way as public beliefs do, which I analyze in sections 4 and 5. I call this eﬀect the
information eﬀect.
Now let us look at a numerical example with α = 1, β = 100, βb = 10, ¯ r = 0.5,
m = 2, w0 = 100, and xb varying from 0.1 to 1.










































¯rb changes with the banks’ private signal xb
Figure 16 shows a non-monotonic relationship between the banks’ beliefs on the
fundamentals and the borrowing rates they charge. When xb is lower than 0.5, the
borrowing rate is increasing in xb, but when xb is greater than 0.5, the borrowing
rate is decreasing in xb. This is because two opposite eﬀects determine the banks’
expected proﬁts. Higher xb makes the banks put more weight on the higher level of
the fundamental r, leading to higher expected proﬁts. But higher xb also makes the
banks expect more ﬁrms to borrow when the fundamentals r is low and nonperforming
loans arise, inducing lower expected proﬁts.
Figure 17 reveals that ρ∗ is very sensitive to xb. When xb is lower than a certain















Figure 17: How ﬁrms’ optimal trigger strategy ρ∗ changes with the banks’ private
signal xb
level, the banks always have negative expected return on the investment, no matter
what ¯ rb is. No banks will lend, and naturally no bankruptcy will occur.
When xb is high enough for banks to lend, the ﬁrms’ optimal trigger strategy
ρ∗ rapidly decreases in the banks’ private signal xb. This impact is attained mainly
through the information eﬀect, instead of the payoﬀ eﬀect, because we can see that
in general the borrowing rate is very close to zero and has little impact on the ﬁrms’
optimal trigger strategy.
The following ﬁgures reveal how systemic bankruptcy is inﬂuenced by the banks’
private signal xb.
From the ﬁgures above we can see that pessimistic banks will make coordina-
tion more diﬃcult, but at the same time will curb systemic bankruptcy. In the
extreme case, the banks will not lend at all. Therefore, no bankruptcy occurs. On
the other hand, optimism among banks will lead to easier coordination, but systemic
bankruptcy also tends to be more severe once it happens.
The policy implication derived from this model is that an optimistic sentiment
among banks will be an important indicator of possible severe systemic bankruptcy.



























Figure 18: How economic fundamentals r at maximum loss changes with banks’
private signals

















































































This ﬁnding is also consistent with the anecdotal observation that severe ﬁnancial
crises usually break out shortly after an economic boom when the banks are still
optimistic.






















Figure 20: How total loss varies with the banks’ private signal xb
7 Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future Re-
search
This paper explains the origin of systemic bankruptcy of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms by coordi-
nation failure in a decentralized credit economy with investment complementarities.
By doing so, I provide a new explanation about how volatility in real investment can
cause ﬁnancial fragility. I hope that my research can promote a better understanding
of the origin of ﬁnancial fragility, and provide theoretical guidance for central banks
to establish an “early warning system” to prevent the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises.
The main conclusions and policy implications from this paper are as follows:
1. Systemic bankruptcy can originate from coordination failure in a decentralized
credit economy with investment complementarities. Due to investment comple-
mentarities, an economy can be more vulnerable to systemic bankruptcy.
2. Systemic bankruptcy becomes possible when economic fundamentals fall into a
middle range, where coordination is critical. Moreover, it tends to break out
when the fundamentals are taking a low to medium value in this range.
363. Financial leverage of ﬁrms is an important indicator revealing the fragility of a
ﬁnancial system. Higher ﬁnancial leverage of ﬁrms greatly increases the possi-
bility and severity of systemic bankruptcy.
4. Optimistic public beliefs of ﬁrms and banks can alleviate coordination failure.
Systemic bankruptcy will happen with lower economic fundamentals. But once
it happens, it tends to be more severe.
In summary, systemic bankruptcy caused by coordination failure will hit an econ-
omy most severely when economic fundamentals fall into the coordination failure zone
with a lending boom generated by high ﬁnancial leverage and optimistic public beliefs
of ﬁrms and optimistic beliefs of banks. Central banks should be highly alert about
ﬁnancial fragility in such economic situations.
A future direction to extend this paper is to put it in a General Equilibrium
framework where uncertainty, investment complementarities and borrowing-lending
relationships are present. In the current model, banks are assumed to have limitless
access to some funds at an exogenously given cost. In a General Equilibrium model,
I will be able to endogenize the size and cost of the funds that banks have. By doing
so, I will be able to study investment ﬂuctuations generated by uncertainty, invest-
ment complementarities and borrowing-lending relationships. In my another thesis
paper, I have established an Overlapping Generation model where both uncertainty
and investment complementarities exist to study the relationship between economic
growth and volatility. It will be interesting to see what diﬀerence it will make to
introduce the borrowing-lending relationship into the model.
37APPENDIX 1
This appendix gives the proof that ﬁrm x∗’s expected gross return rate from
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Now pick up any ρ∗ ∈ R and let ρ0 = ρ∗ + 4ρ, where 4ρ is a small positive
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β < 2π, we have r
00∗ < r
0∗. Let 4r = r
0∗ − r















































β (ρ0−¯ r))−m+1)dr0 >
0 since it is the integral of a positive function over a normal distribution. This
property holds when 4ρ → 0.
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where a ∈ R is a constant.
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if ρ0 > ρ∗.
Since the ﬁrst item in ER(aI|ρ0) is greater than 0 and the second item is greater
than ER(aI|ρ∗), I prove that ER(aI|ρ0) > ER(aI|ρ∗). Let 4ρ → 0, I prove that the
objective function is strictly increasing in ρ∗ given α2
β < 2π.
39APPENDIX 2: The Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix shows how the unique trigger strategy equilibrium can be obtained
by using the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
The expected gross return rate from investing of a ﬁrm receiving a private signal
ρ given all the others follow the switching strategy ˆ ρ, which is denoted by ER(ρ, ˆ ρ),
is given by
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Notice that ER(ρ, ˆ ρ) is increasing in ρ, and decreasing in ˆ ρ.
When ρ is suﬃciently low, not investing will be the dominant strategy for a ﬁrm,
no matter what strategies other ﬁrms will take. Let us denote it by ρ
0. All ﬁrms
realize this and rule out any strategy for ﬁrms to invest below ρ
0. Then investing





This is because the trigger strategy around ρ
1 is the best respond to the trigger
strategy around ρ
0, and all ﬁrms believe that other ﬁrms will not invest when their
private signals are below ρ
1. Since the ﬁrms’ expected return is decreasing in the
second argument, this rule out any strategy for ﬁrms to invest below ρ
1. Proceeding
this way, I get an increasing sequence:
ρ
0 < ρ
1 < · · ·ρ
k < · · ·,
where any strategy of investing when ρ < ρ
k does not survive k rounds of deletion
of dominated strategies. The sequence is increasing because ER(·,·) is increasing in
the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second one. The smallest solution ρ to the
equation ER(ρ,ρ) = 1 is the least upper bound of this sequence, and hence its limit.
Any strategy of investing below ρ cannot survive iterated dominance.
40Similarly, I can have an analogous argument beginning with the case that ρ is large
enough and the strategy to invest is dominant no matter what strategies other ﬁrms
will take. If ρ is the largest solution to ER(ρ,ρ) = 1, any strategy of not investing
when the signal is higher than ρ cannot survive the deletion of dominated strategies.
I have proved that given γ < 2π, there is a unique solution to ER(ρ,ρ) = 1. So the
smallest solution is equal to the largest solution. There is only one strategy surviving
the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, which is the unique equilibrium
strategy in this game.
Q.E.D
41APPENDIX 3: The Proof of Proposition 3
Given the borrowing rate e¯ rb oﬀered by the banks, the private signal of the banks, xb
and its own private signal xi, ﬁrm i will update its belief on the fundamental based on
Bayes’ rule. Thus we get (˜ r|xb,xi) ∼ N(
α¯ r+βbxb+βxi
α+βb+β , 1
α+βb+β), where ρi =
α¯ r+βbxb+βxi
α+βb+β
is the mean and α + βb + β is the precision.
I can prove that there is a unique equilibrium in the ﬁrms’ game. In equilibrium,
a ﬁrm will invest if and only if its belief ρi is greater than some critical value ρ∗. The
proof is basically the same as that in section 3 except some small modiﬁcations.
First, I need to pin down ρ∗. Suppose that ﬁrm i is at the switching point, that
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With the same method I use in the appendix 1, I can prove that the above equation
is strictly increasing in ρ∗, given
(α+βb)2
β < 2π. Here I omit the proof. Based on the
above equation, we ﬁnd the unique solution of ρ∗(¯ rb,xb).
Now let us look at the ﬁrst mover of this game, the banks. The banks fully
understand the game among the ﬁrms and the equilibrium strategies of the ﬁrms.
Taking the equilibrium strategies of the ﬁrms into consideration, the banks will set
the lowest borrowing rate ¯ rb that makes the zero expected proﬁt in the banking sector.
42This is the unique equilibrium and no bank will deviate. By raising the borrowing
rate, a bank cannot have any ﬁrm to borrow. While by lowering the borrowing rate,
the bank will make negative proﬁt.
After observing xb, a bank updates its believe about the fundamental, ˜ r. The
mean of (˜ r|xb) is
ρb =
α¯ r + βbxb
α + βb
, (14)
and the precision is α + βb.







α + βb(r − ρb))(mw0e







α + βb(r − ρb))(m − 1)w0(e
¯ rb − 1)(1 − l(r,ρ
∗))dr,
The borrowing rate, e¯ r∗
b, that a bank will charge is the smallest positive solution





α + βb(r − ρb))(me







α + βb(r − ρb))(m − 1)(e
¯ rb − 1)(1 − l(r,ρ
∗))dr = 0. (15)
Notice that when xb is low enough, the expected proﬁt of banks from lending will
be always negative. Thus the banks will lend if and only if xb is large enough such
that max{EΠb(ρ∗, ¯ rb)} ≥ 0. Or the banks will choose not to lend.
Q.E.D
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